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ABSTRACT. Many papers in the recent literature on participatory approaches emphasize the need to take better account of the
complexity of the social contexts in which they are conducted. Without attention to power asymmetries, there is a risk that the
most powerful stakeholders will have greater influence on the outcomes of the participatory process than marginalized
stakeholders. However, very few authors address the question of how to deal with such power asymmetries. This question puts
designers of participatory processes in a dilemma. On the one hand, if they claim a neutral posture, they are accused of being
naively manipulated by the most powerful stakeholders and of increasing initial power asymmetries; but, on the other hand, if
they adopt a nonneutral posture and decide to empower some particular stakeholders, their legitimacy to do so is questioned.
We test a particular posture to overcome this dilemma: that is, a “critical companion” posture, which strategically deals with
power asymmetries to avoid increasing initial power asymmetries, and which suggests that designers should make explicit their
assumptions and objectives regarding the social context so that local stakeholders can choose to accept them as legitimate or to
reject them. Legitimacy is seen as the product of a coconstruction process between the designers and the participants. This
posture was tested in the context of a participatory process conducted in northern Thailand to address a conflict between the
creation of a national park and two local communities. While we show that this posture makes it possible for designers to be
both strategic and legitimate at the same time, it also raises new questions and new dilemmas. Can we, and should we, really
make all our assumptions explicit? How can we deal with stakeholders who refuse to engage in any form of dialog? We conclude
that there is no “right” posture to adopt, but that designers need to be more reflexive about their own postures.
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INTRODUCTION
The United Nations Conference held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992
endorsed the concept of sustainable development as a guiding
principle and emphasized stakeholder participation as an
important means to achieve it (United Nations 1993). Since
then, numerous participatory approaches have been developed
to promote more dialog between local stakeholders, decision
makers, and researchers, in fields such as water management
(Pahl-Wostl et al. 2007, Kuper et al. 2009, Von Korff et al.
2012), forest management (Agrawal and Gupta 2005), and
agricultural development (Chambers et al. 1989, Pretty 1995).
In these fields, participation is seen as a way to deal with the
uncertain and complex nature of social–ecological systems
and to increase people’s adaptive capacity through enhanced
social learning for the integrated and adaptive management of
natural resources (Gunderson and Holling 2002, Lynam et al.
2002, Walker et al. 2002, Berkes et al. 2003).  
However, although the concept of participation intrinsically
embodies an objective of social and political equity (Cornwall
and Gaventa 2001), lessons from the past tell us that more
careful attention needs to be paid to genuinely achieving
equitable impacts (Eversol 2003, Johnson et al. 2004, Agrawal
and Gupta 2005). Indeed, participatory approaches take place
in heterogeneous social contexts characterized by conflicts of
interest and power asymmetries (Daré and Barreteau 2003,
Becu et al. 2008, Barnaud et al. 2010). There is a risk of the
more powerful stakeholders having greater influence on the
outcomes of the participatory process than marginalized and
socially disadvantaged stakeholders (Munoz et al. 2007, Sikor
and Nguyen 2007). This is why numerous authors highlight
the need to better understand the complexity of the social
contexts in which participatory processes are conducted
(Moity-Maïzi 2000, Edmunds and Wollenberg 2001).
Methods such as stakeholder analysis are more and more
considered essential to deciding who should be involved in
participatory processes (Reed et al. 2009).  
Still, despite a growing body of literature that emphasizes the
need to better understand power asymmetries among
stakeholders, very few authors address the “how” question,
that is, how to take into account power asymmetries when
designing and implementing a participatory process.  
This question is frequently overlooked because it is not so
much a matter of method as a matter of posture. The postures
adopted by the designers of participatory processes are indeed
driven by norms, values, or ideologies that are rarely made
explicit. Moreover, the question of how to deal with power
asymmetries puts them in a dilemma. On the one hand, if they
claim a neutral posture regarding power asymmetries, they are
accused of being naively manipulated by the most powerful
stakeholders (Cooke and Kothari 2001, Edmunds and
1INRA, UMR1201 DYNAFOR, 2Toulouse University, INPT-ENSAT, 3Toulouse University, INPT EI Purpan, 4Knowledge, Technology and Innovation
Group, Wageningen University
Wollenberg 2001) and of taking the risk of the participatory
process increasing asymmetries among stakeholders.
Therefore, their neutrality is illusory. On the other hand, if
they claim a nonneutral posture and empower some
stakeholders, they are accused of intervening in a social system
and modifying it without having the legitimacy to do so (Innes
2004).  
Here, we suggest and test a posture that attempts to overcome
this dilemma. This posture, which we call the “critical
companion” posture, is a nonneutral posture that recognizes
the necessity to take into account power asymmetries to avoid
the risk of increasing initial asymmetries. The designer
adopting this posture needs to make his underlying
assumptions and objectives explicit so that stakeholders can
choose to accept them as legitimate or to reject them.
Legitimacy is seen as the result of a coconstruction process
between designers and stakeholders.  
We do not think that this is necessarily the “right” posture to
adopt. We do not even believe that such a “right” posture
exists. We aim to better understand the complexity of the
question of how power asymmetries in participatory
approaches should be dealt with by questioning the practical
implications of this posture, its coherence, its potential, and
its limits, and highlighting the questions that arise when it is
adopted.
THEORETICAL INSIGHTS
Power and participation in development studies
In this paper, we focus on the issue of power and participation
at the local level of social interactions among stakeholders.
However, the issue of power and participation is also debated
in the larger context of development and North-South
relationships. We briefly explain the position of critical social
scientists in these larger scale debates, before focusing on the
debates regarding the implementation of multistakeholder
participatory processes at the local level. Several movements
arose in the 1980s as a reaction against development, as it
implied the imposition of the western discourse that
represented subsistence societies as economically and
technically underdeveloped (Escobar 1988). Anti-development
theorists took a principled stance against the idea of
development, and post-development theorists esteemed that
populist movements should make the difference. In practice,
development programs have tried to solve the issue via
engagement in more bottom-up participatory approaches.
However, both anti- and post-development proponents
condemn participation because it remains a form of external
intervention. As for critical social scientists, they do not reject
managerial interventions, but call for critical studies of
inherent power dynamics. They note that global civil society
has taken the responsibility to advance emancipation; hence,
we should carefully study power dynamics as triggered by
populist movements as well as by more invited forms of
participation to learn how better to support democratic change
(Flood and Jackson 1991, Nederveen Pieterse 2000, Ulrich
2000, Hickey and Mohan 2005, Mitlin et al. 2007). They
suggest that we should remain cautious about participation “as
the wolf of control and subjugation still lurks beneath the new
sheep’s clothing” (Blaikie 2000:1045).
Dialogical vs. strategic perspectives
The power issue has also drawn a dividing line among
researchers in the field of participatory multistakeholder
processes (Faysse 2006). Two main perspectives can be
distinguished: dialogical and strategic, inspired respectively
by soft-systems theories (Checkland 1981) and critical
systems theories (Ulrich 1995, Jackson 2000). The former
emphasize the differences in perceptions among stakeholders
and their lack of mutual understanding. They consider dialog
and communication as the main issue on which to focus to
achieve better collaboration among stakeholders (Pretty
1995). Advocates of the strategic perspective underline the
limited ability of dialogical approaches to deal with situations
that are too conflictive or coercive (Leeuwis 2000). They note
that, in these situations, dialog is not sufficient to achieve
equitable impacts. According to them, the designers of
participatory processes should strategically intervene in
multistakeholder settings to ensure that the less influential
stakeholders have a chance to voice and assert their interests
(Edmunds and Wollenberg 2001). Although these two
perspectives are sometimes seen as antagonistic (Faysse
2006), several authors highlight their complementarities
(Jackson 2000, Leeuwis 2000, Ulrich 2003, van Paassen et al.
2011). First, as Jackson (2000) noted, it depends on the
context. In some situations with few power asymmetries or
conflicts of interest, dialog is possible, whereas in other
situations in which stakes are higher and more controversial,
more strategic facilitation is needed; but even in contexts with
high stakes and controversies, dialogical and strategic
approaches can be combined and complement each other. A
strategic approach dealing with power asymmetries can help
unmask such asymmetries and prevent them from dominating
the setting; this may open the floor to more dialogical
processes that are more driven by argumentation than
coercion, i.e., that get closer to Habermas’ ideal speech
situation (Habermas 1985).
The companion modeling approach: making designers’
assumptions explicit
The posture we tested here is also inspired by the companion
modeling (ComMod) approach. This participatory approach
is aimed at facilitating collective learning processes among
various stakeholders (including researchers) about a common
problem in complex social–ecological systems (Bousquet et
al. 1999). It is based on the coconstruction of simulation
models integrating various stakeholders’ perceptions, and the
use of these simulation models to jointly explore and discuss
possible future scenarios. Among the numerous participatory
approaches described in the literature, an originality of the
ComMod approach is that the researchers who developed it
elaborated a chart about the deontological implications of their
posture (Barreteau et al. 2003). This chart recognizes the
existence of multiple legitimate points of view and considers
that the researchers’ point of view is just one point of view
among others. The assumptions backing the participatory
process (definition of objective, choice of methods, etc.) and
the modeling activity (scientific assumptions) are purposively
submitted to refutation at each interaction with the
stakeholders. The approach is adaptive and iterative so that
the participants can continuously question, criticize, or
validate it. Some ComMod researchers emphasize, in
particular, the need for the designers to clarify their objectives
and their posture regarding the social context to avoid raising
false expectations (Barreteau et al. 2010) and to increase their
chance of success (D’Aquino 2007). However, the ComMod
chart is not specific about the posture regarding the way to
deal with power asymmetries. A recent study showed that the
researchers applying this method adopted very contrasting
postures; some opting for dialogical postures, and some for
more strategic ones (Barnaud et al. 2011). In this paper, we
define and test our critical companion posture to explore the
compatibility between a critical approach and the
deontological requirements of the companion modeling
approach. At first sight, one can indeed expect some
contradictions between being strategic and being transparent.
Defining a critical companion posture
The critical companion posture recognizes the need to take
power asymmetries into account to avoid the risk of increasing
initial social inequities. This is a nonneutral posture. We
believe that claiming a neutral posture is problematic not only
because of the risk of overlooking power asymmetries and
reinforcing them, but also because, if a designer does not make
his biases explicit, he risks imposing them unconsciously.
However, claiming nonneutrality is not sufficient to overcome
the above-mentioned dilemma: if a designer deliberately
empowers some particular stakeholders, one can question his
legitimacy to be so interventionist in a given social context.
Drawing on the companion modeling approach, we suggest
that the designer of a participatory process adopting a critical
companion posture should, whenever possible, make explicit
his assumptions and objectives regarding the social context,
so that local stakeholders can decide whether they accept them
as legitimate or reject them. Their adhesion to the objectives
and assumptions of the participatory process is considered as
the main source of legitimacy of this process. In the critical
companion posture, the explicit objective is the facilitation of
an equitable concerted process, that is, a process in which all
stakeholders have an equal chance to voice and assert their
interests. Like Habermas’ ideal speech situation, this is a
theoretical ideal that is useful for the identification of factors
that impede its realization, and the elaboration of possible
measures to enhance more equitable concertation.
METHODS
To test the pertinence of this critical companion posture, we
applied an action-research methodology, i.e., we conducted
on the ground a companion modeling (ComMod) process
adopting such a posture. The first author of this paper was the
main designer of the process, supported by a team of Thai and
French researchers. The second author was not directly
involved in the participatory process but contributed to an
external evaluation of it. This experiment was conducted in
2006 in northern Thailand in the context of a conflict between
a national park being established and two ethnic minority
communities located near the future boundaries of the park.
Context and objective of the participatory process
The highlands of northern Thailand are inhabited by ethnic
minorities who have long been accused of degrading the upper
watersheds of the country’s major basins (McKinnon and
Vienne 1989). They used to practice a type of shifting slash-
and-burn agriculture that was blamed for deforestation, and in
1989 the government enforced a ban on encroachment that
forced them to shift to a permanent type of agriculture (Hirsch
1997). In the 1990s, the government reinforced its
environmental policies and further restricted their access to
land and forest resources through the delimitation of reserved
forest areas managed by the Royal Forestry Department and
the establishment of new national parks and wildlife
sanctuaries. However, at the same time, the policy framework
also favored decentralization and public participation
(Arghiros 2001). This contradiction resulted in an increased
number of conflicts over land use between local communities
and state agencies, like the conflict described here.  
This conflict took place in the province of Nan, one of the
northern provinces of Thailand near the border with Laos,
between a new national park and two communities belonging
to the Mien ethnic group. The process of the creation of the
national park had started in 1996, but in 2006 when the initial
diagnosis was conducted, the conflict had reached a peak
because the park was meant to be officially declared open the
following year, in 2007. Technically, in 2006, the area was
still under the management of a local office of the Royal
Forestry Department (RFD), established in the early 1990s,
that had been in charge of delimiting farm and forest land in
each village to prevent further encroachment. After an initial
period of conflict with villagers, the RFD officers had adopted
more participatory approaches and established informal
agreements with them. In particular, they delimited some
informal community forests in which farmers could practice
their religious rituals and gather nontimber forest products
(NTFP). In local farmers’ livelihood systems, the collection
of NTFP is indeed a key source of food and income, in
particular among the most resource-poor households.  
However, according to Thai law, no human activity except
tourism is allowed within a national park. The RFD officers
tried to convince the chief of the new national park to make
some local informal arrangements, but he was not prone to
conciliation. In 2006, the relations between the national park
and the villagers reflected mutual mistrust and strong
prejudices on both sides. The general situation was unclear,
with a lot of misinformation among villagers. In particular,
the key questions of the future location of the park boundary
and the rules to be enforced within the park regarding the
collection of NTFP had not yet been discussed beyond a
limited circle of village leaders. In this climate of conflict,
there was a risk that the chief of the national park would make
unilateral decisions or, at best, after consulting a few village
leaders only. 
In this context, the aim of the ComMod process was to
accompany the ongoing negotiation by facilitating a concerted
process between villagers and national park officers, while
taking into account the diversity of interests among villagers.
We emphasized the existence of heterogeneities and power
asymmetries within communities because many participatory
approaches conducted in northern Thailand failed to take this
heterogeneity into account and were dominated by local elites
and village leaders (Neef 2005, Becu et al. 2008). The myth
of a homogeneous community is indeed very strong in the
scientific community studying ethnic minorities (Guijt and
Shah 1998). Some authors speak of ethno-romanticism (Neef
2005).
Main principles of the critical companion modeling
process
As in several ComMod processes, two kinds of simulation
tools were combined in this process: computer agent-based
models (ABM) and role-playing games (RPG). Agent-based
models are particularly appropriate to represent complex
social–ecological systems because of their ability to represent
interactions among heterogeneous social agents and between
these agents and their common environment (Ferber 1999,
Bousquet and LePage 2004). Role-playing games are an
appropriate mode of communication to convey complexity as
it allows multiple stakeholders to interactively examine the
complex systems of which they are part (Duke 1974). In a
RPG, players can discuss and test alternative scenarios of
potential solutions, but the use of this tool quickly becomes
costly and very time consuming. To remove these constraints,
it is possible to build a simple computerized ABM, very similar
to the RPG in its features and rules but far more cost and time
efficient, to simulate scenarios. Moreover, because the RPG
is based on the same conceptual model as the ABM, the use
of the RPG can be seen as a way to “open the black box” of
the computer ABM (Barreteau et al. 2001). It allows players
to understand, validate, and/or criticize and enrich it and, later
on, to be able to follow ABM simulations and to comment on
their results. Therefore, the model underlying both the ABM
and the RPG is built iteratively, based on a combination of
knowledge coming from the researchers’ observations and the
local stakeholders' suggestions. 
This ComMod process, conducted with a critical stance (Fig.
1), started with a 4-month, in-depth analysis of the initial
agrarian and institutional situation through individual
semidirected interviews (approximately 30 farmers, village
leaders, national park officers, foresters, etc.) (Barnaud et al.
2008). Drawing on theories of agrarian systems (Mazoyer and
Roudart 1997) and institutional analysis (Ostrom et al. 1994),
this initial analysis aimed to understand the key natural
resource management problem; the key stakeholders; their
interests regarding the issue at stake; their perceptions of the
situation and of the other stakeholders; and the social
interactions among them, including rules of access to
resources and power relations. This initial analysis is
considered as a key stage of the critical process as it allows us
to identify the potential obstacles to an equitable concerted
process (Fig. 1). When implementing the participatory
process, we made specific choices to try to overcome these
obstacles. A reflexive analysis of these nonneutral choices was
conducted, following Ulrich’s (2003) critical systems thinking
approach aimed at promoting reflexivity in operational
research, specifically regarding the way to deal with power
asymmetries.
Fig. 1. Framework of a ComMod process conducted with
critical companion posture.
This initial analysis was followed by a series of participatory
workshops combining the following activities: (1) RPG
sessions in which the participants (farmers and administrators)
played their own role and interactively examined the complex
systems of which they were part, (2) plenary and subgroup
discussions about problems encountered in the game and
possible solutions, and (3) computer ABM simulations to
explore longer term effects of these solutions and/or to enlarge
discussions at village level (more than 50 participating
villagers). First, several workshops were conducted in each
village to help villagers reflect among themselves on the
establishment of the national park. Other workshops were
organized with national park officers and forest officers to
allow them to discuss among themselves the conflict with the
villagers. Finally, a workshop was organized with all
stakeholders (villagers from both villages, and national park
and forest officers) to jointly explore the potential economic,
social, and ecological consequences of various sets of possible
forest management rules.  
Throughout the process, efforts were made to be explicit about
the objectives and assumptions backing the process, so as to
question and build the legitimacy of the process with the
participants. Concretely, we said that our objective was to test
a kind of communication platform in which all stakeholders
would have an equal chance to voice and assert their interests,
and that we assumed that this might facilitate the emergence
of win–win solutions. We systematically engaged in
discussions with villagers, village leaders, and national park
officers to make them express what they thought of the
suggested participatory process. We asked them whether the
process focus and design met their interests and
preoccupations and, if it did not, how it might be possible to
design a process that would better meet their expectations. For
example, for the final workshop, the chief of the national park
expressed his willingness to focus on the forest management
rules rather than on the park boundaries, because he felt more
comfortable meeting with villagers on this less conflictive
issue. 
Regarding the monitoring and evaluation process, individual
interviews of participants were conducted right after and in
between the workshops to monitor the effects of the process
in terms of (1) evolution or new definition of the issue at stake,
(2) changes in stakeholders’ perceptions and interactions (for
example: expression and/or evolution of power relations), and
(3) obstacles to the emergence of a concerted process (Fig. 1).
This evaluation framework is based on learning, negotiation
(Leeuwis 2004), and power theories (Giddens 1984, Boulding
1989). This monitoring process was used to adjust the process
and the tools to the observed changes in an adaptive way. The
described series of workshops was not predetermined but
designed step by step, to adjust continuously to the evolution
of the local context, the learning and negotiation process
among the participants, their preoccupations, and their
expectations regarding the ComMod process.
RESULTS
Some obstacles to the emergence of an equitable
concerted process
A detailed description of the sociopolitical and agro-
ecological context of this case study is available elsewhere
(Barnaud et al. 2008). Here, we present the key stakeholders’
interests and power relations, and the subsequent potential
obstacles to the emergence of an equitable concerted process.
Figure 2 presents a matrix of stakeholders’ importance and
influence regarding the issue at stake (the establishment of the
new national park). Importance refers to the degree to which
the stakeholders are potentially affected by the issue at stake,
and influence refers to the degree to which they can influence
the outcome of this issue (Grimble and Wellard 1997).
Fig. 2. Matrix showing the key stakeholders’ relative
influence and importance in the national park issue, Nan
Province, Thailand.
Three main types of farming households were identified within
the communities, characterized by different socioeconomic
constraints and farming strategies and having consequently
contrasting interests regarding the national park issue (Fig. 2).
Type A households were very vulnerable landless or nearly
landless households that were highly dependent on nontimber
forest products (NTFP) for both cash income and family
consumption. Without access to NTFP, they would have to
leave the village and work as urban wage earners. Therefore,
they were potentially the most affected by the national park
issue. Because they did not belong to the influential clans of
the community and did not participate greatly in local politics,
they were also the most poorly informed villagers about the
national park issue, with the least ability to influence the
ongoing negotiations.  
Type B farming households earned their main income from
agriculture and were mainly concerned about the risk of losing
land, but this risk was actually not very high. Nontimber forest
products were also a concern as a complementary source of
cash to compensate for fluctuating farming incomes. They
were potentially less affected by the national park issue than
type A households. Moreover, being less marginalized than
type A farmers, their ability to influence the negotiations was
relatively higher.  
Type C farming households belonged to the local elite. They
had enough capital to invest in rather profitable off-farm
activities, allowing them consequently to invest in large
plantations of litchi or coffee trees. Therefore, they did not
feel threatened by the national park issue. Thanks to their social
status and their higher level of education, they could be more
active in local politics and had a greater ability to influence
the issue at stake than the other two types of farmers. Most
village leaders belonged to this latter type. However, a
distinction should be made between village leaders and other
type C farmers with no formal political responsibilities. We
designate these latter as apolitical, although their wealth and
status meant that they potentially had significant informal
political influence. Within the village, because of their
political status, village leaders had the highest influence over
the issue at stake.  
As for the chief of the national park, he was obviously the
most influential, as the law allowed him to take decisions
unilaterally, but he was also potentially affected by the issue
at stake, with a real risk of losing his job. His objective was
to do his duty and enforce the law, but he was afraid of possible
violent reactions from the villagers. It had happened
previously that villagers started forest fires or shot forest
rangers. 
Royal Forestry Department officers were in a go-between
position. As a state agency, they had to collaborate with the
chief of the national park but, unlike him, they tolerated the
presence of villagers in the forest areas under their
management. They had established rather good relationships
with villagers in the past, agreeing on comanagement rules,
and they did not want to see the new national park spoiling
the results of these past efforts. They were the main supporters
of the ComMod process.  
From this initial stakeholder analysis, we identified two main
kinds of obstacles to the emergence of an equitable concerted
process: horizontal obstacles (involving interactions among
villagers) and vertical obstacles (involving interactions
between villagers and higher level administrations).  
The first vertical obstacle was that villagers and village leaders
were not aware of the proactive role they could or should have
played in the negotiation with the national park. After several
decades of highly centralized management of natural
resources, in which they had to undergo various top-down
forest policies reducing their access to the forest, disobedience
or the threat of violence towards authorities were their major
means of expression. Therefore, many villagers felt that it was
pointless to discuss issues with the board of the national park
who would not listen to them in any case. On the national
park’s side, despite the recent decentralization policies and the
adoption of a discourse promoting participatory approaches,
the chief of the national park remained very top-down minded.
Like many administrators in Thailand, he had strong
prejudices against ethnic minorities, seeing them as forest
destroyers “who always want more and with whom it is
impossible to discuss, because they don’t understand
anything.”  
At the horizontal level, we saw that community members had
unequal access to information and unequal opportunities to
participate in decision making at the village level. There was
a danger that the interests of type A farmers would not be taken
into account, and in particular that the NTFP issue would be
overlooked in the negotiations with the national park, because
the village leaders, who did not need to collect NTFP, did not
feel concerned about this issue. Although our survey showed
that more than one-third of the communities were highly
dependent on NTFP, a village leader told us when we first met
him: “Nobody collects forest products anymore nowadays.
People prefer to buy food in town.” This is what Ribot (2001)
calls a lack of downwards accountability of leaders.
The nonneutral methodological choices and their effects
When implementing the ComMod process, we intentionally
made several methodological choices to try to overcome these
obstacles. In this section, we describe some of these choices
and their effects.
Starting with empowerment
Edmunds and Wollenberg (2001) argue that not all
stakeholders should systematically participate in all stages of
a multistakeholder process. If not yet empowered prior to such
an exercise, the less powerful might not be able to properly
defend their interests. We chose to start the process with a
series of separate workshops with villagers only. We assumed
that if villagers had met national park officers without
preliminary debates among them, there were two risks:
villagers might have appeared divided and therefore in a weak
position in front of the national park’s officers, and the interests
of the less influential villagers would have been overlooked.
In these first workshops, villagers participated in a role-
playing game, playing their own role in two scenarios, with
and without national park officers. Individual interviews
revealed that these workshops increased the villagers’
awareness of the necessity to reflect collectively at village
level on the national park issue. They created or enhanced a
feeling of collective mobilization to prepare the negotiations
with the board of the national park.
Also focusing on the powerful stakeholders
Dealing with power asymmetries requires a focus also on the
powerful stakeholders, in particular those with a strong “best
alternative to a negotiated agreement,” or BATNA (Fisher and
Ury 1981). The chief of the national park had a strong BATNA:
if there was no negotiated agreement with the villagers, he
would simply apply the law. On the other hand, the poorest
villagers had a very low BATNA. It was very important for
them that the national park would agree to engage in dialog.
Therefore, we put a lot of effort into trying to convince the
chief of the national park that it was in his interest to dialog
with the villagers.
Strategically selecting the participants
We selected participants carefully to ensure a representation
of the diversity of interests in the community. We assumed
that, without such a selection, there was a risk that the people
who usually do not participate in local politics would not join
the workshop. This assumption proved to be right, because
when we were discussing the list of participants with village
leaders, they systematically considered it pointless to invite
poor farmers with low levels of education. Here, the leaders
tried to use their power to include or exclude some specific
stakeholders; this is a rather common phenomenon.
Using tools highlighting diversity of interests
Wollenberg et al. (2001) emphasize that participatory
approaches often fail to tackle power inequities because their
designers aim to reach a consensus too fast. This consensus
then often reflects the opinion of the most influential
participants. These authors suggest highlighting the diversity
of interests instead, to facilitate the emergence of more creative
and integrative alternatives. In the described experiment, the
role-playing games were intentionally designed to highlight
the fact that type A, B, and C farmers had different interests
in the national park issue. In particular, playing the game raised
the NTFP issue, which might otherwise have been overlooked.
We also used a “card-ranking technique.” All the problems
relating to the establishment of the national park raised by the
participants (i.e., risk of losing agricultural land, right to collect
NTFP, right to collect wood, etc.) were visualized on small
cards, and the participants were invited to rank them. The
individual interviews conducted after the workshop revealed
that one of the key effects of these workshops was an increased
awareness of the points of view of other villagers and the
situations affecting them— leading to an enhanced mutual
understanding among villagers. In particular, this process
increased the village leaders’ awareness of the situation for
type A farmers. They realized that it was vital for them to
obtain the right to collect NTFP in the national park area. To
a certain extent, the process increased their downwards
accountability toward villagers. The observed change in
attitude also relates to the fact that they realized that the NTFP
issue was an opportunity to show to the national park officers
that villagers had community rules that avoided
overexploitation of forest resources. This had the potential to
create more trust vis-à-vis the national park, and would
increase their chance of being heard on other aspects of the
conflict.
Alternating individual interviews and subgroup discussions
with plenary debates
We assumed that, in plenary debates, the less influential
stakeholders would often not dare express their opinion in the
presence of more dominant ones. This assumption also proved
correct on several occasions. For example, during the first
workshop, two poor women had explained during subgroup
discussions that NTFP for food purposes were more important
than those for commercial purposes. Immediately after, during
the plenary session, they said the opposite. They explained to
us during the individual interviews that the village leader had
asked them to do so. This village leader had used his relation
of patronage with those poor women to influence them. This
anecdote illustrates the need to be cautious about any
“consensus” or “collective” agreements obtained in a plenary
session.
Using tools favoring integrative negotiation processes
Scholars in the field of negotiation distinguish between
distributive and integrative negotiation processes. In a
distributive process, the stakeholders just fight to “share the
cake” in a zero-sum process. In contrast, in an integrative
process, the stakeholders try to reframe the problem at stake
to “enlarge the cake” and identify “win–win” solutions (Follett
1940). Integrative processes are more favorable to
disadvantaged stakeholders because, otherwise, powerful
stakeholders have no interest in questioning the status quo;
but integrative processes require a collective learning process
in which both sides look beyond their initial positioning to
examine the underlying interests determining them. At some
stage in the final workshop, the negotiations between villagers
and national park officers had reached a standstill because of
a frontal confrontation over the issue of the boundary of the
park. They just fought to “share the cake” in a distributive
negotiation mode. The following day, we suggested that the
participants imagine for a while that they had a common space
to manage collectively, with no boundary. Agent-based
simulations were proposed to the participants to facilitate a
collective brainstorming on the forest management rules in
this hypothetic common space (Barnaud et al. 2012). The
agent-based model represented 15 farming households
belonging to different socioeconomic groups who made
decisions regarding labor allocation, crop selection, and
gathering NTFP. Three scenarios were simulated to test
different collective rules regarding the gathering of NTFP and
forest encroachment. When presenting the results of
simulations, we did not focus on the spatial dynamics so as to
avoid the boundary issue dominating the debate. Instead, we
focused on the effects of the three scenarios on the different
stakeholders through a series of social, economic, and
ecological indicators. This allowed the participants to reframe
the problem at stake, to move from a debate on the boundary
to a debate on the rules for accessing resources, to adopt a
more integrative negotiation mode, and to acknowledge that
they had mutual interests. At the end of the workshop, they
had written and signed a kind of “memorandum of
understanding” stipulating that both parties had common
interests (to avoid overexploitation of forest resources, to limit
forest encroachment, and to control forest fires) and should
reflect on them and discuss them collectively in the future.
Although this paper had a symbolic value only, it was
considered as a key achievement by the participants.  
This anecdote illustrates the importance of using tools that
favor integrative negotiation processes. We argue in Barnaud
et al. (2012) that the use of spatially explicit models and
representations might in some contexts lead to thinking in
terms of boundaries and segregated space and, therefore,
prevent thinking in terms of multifunctional space and finding
innovative and integrative solutions. Therefore, we suggest
using multiple types of supports and representations.
DISCUSSION
We have shown that local power asymmetries among
stakeholders express themselves in a participatory process and
can be obstacles to the emergence of an equitable concerted
process. We have also shown that the designer of a
participatory process can contribute, through his
methodological choices, to increasing or to overcoming some
of these obstacles, at least to a certain extent. The nonneutrality
of these methodological choices implies a continuous and
critical reflection on the legitimacy of participatory methods
and of their designers. The critical companion posture suggests
that, to question and reinforce his legitimacy, the designer
should make explicit his underlying assumptions and
objectives, so that local stakeholders can question them and
reject or accept them as legitimate. Legitimacy is here seen as
a constantly evolving product of a coconstruction process
between the designers and the participants.  
However, this critical companion posture has limitations and
raises a number of questions. 
(1) Can we really make all our assumptions explicit? The first
limitation of this posture is that it is illusory to believe that
one can make all one’s assumptions explicit. In this case, we
emphasized our assumptions regarding power asymmetries,
but this is a subjective choice, itself based on assumptions that
have not been made explicit. Truly making all one’s
assumptions explicit would imply questioning also one’s
cultural norms and values. However, if it is not possible to be
explicit about everything, it is possible to make an effort at
reflexivity. In this process, we used a logbook in which we
wrote down, at each step, the assumptions backing our choices.
(2) Can participants really question these assumptions? First,
such assumptions can be rather abstract notions that are not
easily understandable by local stakeholders. Second, they
might not dare to question and reject these assumptions openly
(politeness, researchers’ status, etc.). To overcome this
limitation, it is very important to monitor the reactions of the
participants and to detect in their behaviors all signs of
disagreements with the process.  
(3) Should we really make all our assumptions explicit? One
can also wonder to what extent it is always pertinent to make
all assumptions explicit to all stakeholders. For example, when
we explained the principles of the process to the chief of the
national park, we did not emphasize villagers’ empowerment.
We rather insisted on the fact that it would be in his interest
to scale down the conflict with the villagers. In other cases,
some marginalized stakeholders can feel threatened when they
have to discuss power issues openly. Flood and Romm (1995)
suggest that, in such circumstances, the designer cannot say
everything openly and should opt for an oblique use of critical
systems thinking. For example, in our case, we never used the
word “power” with villagers. We could say this is simply a
matter of diplomacy, but we see that there is a thin line between
“being transparent with diplomacy,” “strategically hiding
some piece of information,” and “lying to some participants
for some strategic reasons,” which does not fit with the
deontological requirements of the critical companion posture.
This means that, in this posture, the designers should be
convinced that it is in the participants’ interest to join the
process. However, this also raises the question of stakeholders
who feel that it is not in their interest to participate and who
reject any form of dialog.  
(4) How should one deal with stakeholders who reject any
form of dialog? In this case study, a few families refused to
join the process because they had opted for an intimidation
strategy towards the national park (threat of violence and forest
fires). The rest of their community did not approve of this
strategy because it reinforced the hostility of the national park
towards them and reduced their possibility of negotiation.
These few families never agreed to meet us or to come to the
workshops. Some critical authors suggest that, in such
situations, there is a need to adopt a very strategic posture and
to set up mechanisms to exert pressure on reluctant
stakeholders (Leeuwis 2004). Such an option goes against the
key deontological principle of the companion posture, which
says that the participants in a participatory process should be
aware of the objectives of the process and accept them as
legitimate. We recognize here that the critical companion
posture cannot deal with situations where stakeholders reject
any form of dialog. The objective of the critical companion
posture is to propose a given form of communication and an
arena for discussion based on the principles of equity and
voluntarism, even if this arena does not lead to any concrete
decision or action. Further, as the process has been
implemented despite these few families who did not agree with
it, the question is raised as to who the stakeholders are that
validate and legitimate the process, and how they are selected,
according to whose criteria.
CONCLUSION
The formulation and implementation of sustainable
development requires participatory approaches to enable
stakeholders to openly, self-critically, and creatively reflect
on their desirable, feasible futures. This ideal is also called
“reflexive governance.” The practice of reflexive governance
is not without difficulty, as actors have to deal with political
agendas and power games of incumbent stakeholders
(Hendriks and Grin 2007). We provide some ideas about how
to face this challenge and creatively develop conditions for
empowerment and integrative communication. In summary,
dealing with power games in a participatory process is like
finding balance in a situation of permanent unstable
equilibrium, driven by two antagonist forces: on the one hand,
the will to let the stakeholders lead the process, taking the risk
that the most influential stakeholders will dominate it, and on
the other hand, the will to intervene in the discussion arena to
empower the less influential stakeholders, taking the risk of
weakening the legitimacy of the process. Walking such a fine
line, the designer of a participatory process should at each step
question and re-invent the conditions of his equilibrium. What
specific choices to make at a specific point of time and place
depend on the position of the researcher or facilitator in the
contextual situation. Cornwall (2004) introduced the concept
of cultural–political space to underscore the situated nature of
participation. This cultural–political space is a bounded yet
permeable arena, populated by particular actors for specific
reasons, with associated empowering or disciplining
intentions. More research on the diversity of spaces,
illuminating the dynamics of power, facilitation, voice, and
agency is needed to allow us to get a more intricate insight
into how to build genuine sustainable development.
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